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1 The Federal Government’s 
proposal 
On 20 October 2008 Senator Stephen 
Conroy, the federal Minister for 
Broadband, Communications and the 
Digital Economy, informed a Senate 
Estimates Committee that the 
Commonwealth Government was at 
‘the early stages’ of developing a two-
tier filtering scheme for internet 
content, one mandatory and directed 
towards Internet Service Providers 
(ISPs), the other optional. Senator 
Conroy said: 
 
…we are in the early stages. But we 
are looking at two tiers – mandatory 
of illegal material and an option for 
families to get a clean feed service if 
they wish.1
 
The Senator indicated that the 
proposal bore some resemblance to 
ISP filtering schemes in place in other 
countries, including  
 
…Sweden, the UK, Canada and 
New Zealand. This is not some one-
off excursion.2
 
In February 2008, on the release of a 
major Australian Communications and 
Media Authority (ACMA) report,3 
Senator Conroy observed in a Media 
Release: 
 
The ACMA report notes that a 
number of overseas countries 
currently filter their content. ISPs in 
a number of countries, such as the 
United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway 
and Finland, have successfully 
introduced ISP level filtering.4
 
The Media Release went on to say 
 
The Government is undertaking a 
number of activities to inform the 
development of an implementation 
framework for ISP filtering, including 
extensive consultation with industry 
and examining overseas models… 
These filtered services will provide 
protection for children from internet 
websites containing harmful content. 
 
2 Stakeholder responses 
Responses to the Rudd Government’s 
proposal have been predictably mixed. 
There are those who would like to see 
the mandatory tier expanded. For 
example, it is reported that Family First 
Senator Steve Fielding ‘wants 
hardcore pornography and fetish 
material blocked…sparking renewed 
fears the censorship could be 
expanded beyond the category of 
“illegal material”’. A spokesman for 
Senator Nick Xenophon said ‘he would 
look to block access to overseas 
online casino sites’.5  
 
Others are more critical. For the 
Federal Opposition, Senator Nick 
Minchin said it would take ‘a lot of 
convincing’ for the Coalition to support 
the filtering plan, saying ‘The argy-
bargy that would result over what is in 
NSW Parliamentary Library Research Service 
and what is out strikes me as being 
almost impossible to manage and it 
would be a cat chasing its tail’.6  
 
Greens Senator Scott Ludlam asked in 
Senate Estimates about the potential 
status of ‘euthanasia material, 
politically related material, material 
about anorexia’. His concern was that 
a ‘black list’ of sites could become a 
‘very grey list very quickly, depending 
on how much the government thinks 
should be filtered’. 
 
Colin Jacobs, chair of the online users 
lobby group Electronic Frontiers 
Australia said: 
 
I'm not exaggerating when I say that 
this model involves more technical 
interference in the internet 
infrastructure than what is attempted 
in Iran, one of the most repressive 
and regressive censorship regimes 
in the world.7
 
A more measured comment from the 
same lobby group reads: 
 
Although the proponents of the 
clean-feed have made claims to the 
contrary, there are no comparable 
ISP-level filtering systems operating 
in any democracy today. The 
systems typically cited as operating 
successfully in Europe are designed 
merely to prevent accidental access 
to a very small list of illegal sites 
containing child-abuse material. 
 
Responding to his critics, Senator 
Conroy said: 
 
We are not trying to build the Great 
Wall of China. We are not trying to 
be Saudi Arabia, and to say that is 
to simply misrepresent the 
Government position.8
 
3 Internet regulation 
At present, Australian ISPs are not 
required by law to install 
filtering/blocking software, nor block 
access to any sites. However, they 
must make available to subscribers a 
‘scheduled filter’9 or optional filtered 
service. For their part, users are not 
required by law to use filtering 
software, nor purchase any such 
product that is offered or made 
available by an ISP. 
 
Federally in Australia, internet content 
is regulated by Schedules 5 and 7 of 
the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 
(Cth). This is a complaints based 
system administered by the ACMA on 
a co-regulatory basis with the internet 
industry 
 
In summary, as amended in 2007, 
Schedule 5 provides for the regulation 
of Australian ISPs in respect to 
overseas-hosted content. Where the 
ACMA is satisfied that such content is 
‘prohibited content’ or ‘potential 
prohibited content’, it may either refer 
the matter to the police (as in the case 
of child pornography material for 
example), or require the ISP to deal 
with the content in accordance with 
procedures set out in the Industry 
Code of Practice.10  
 
Content hosts are now regulated under 
Schedule 7, which provides for the 
regulation of the new convergent 
technologies, such as broadband 
services to mobile handsets (such as a 
3G handset). Specifically, Schedule 7 
regulates internet content which has 
an ‘Australian connection’. If the 
content is hosted in or provided from 
Australia and is prohibited, or is likely 
to be prohibited, ACMA will direct the 
content service provider to remove or 
prevent access to the content on their 
service.  
 
The definition of ‘prohibited content’11 
is the same for both Schedules 5 and 
7 and is based on the classifications 
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applied by the Classification Board 
under the National Classification Code. 
The following categories of online 
content are prohibited:12
 
• RC classified content. That is, 
material which is illegal in all 
Australian jurisdictions and 
includes child pornography, 
depictions of bestiality, material 
containing excessive violence 
or sexual violence, detailed 
instruction in crime, violence or 
drug use, and/or material that 
advocates the doing of a 
terrorist act. 
• X18+ classified content, which 
refers to real depictions of 
actual sexual activity.  
• R18+ classified content which is 
not subject to a ‘restricted 
access system’13 that prevents 
access by children. This 
includes depictions of simulated 
sexual activity, material 
containing strong, realistic 
violence and other material 
dealing with intense adult 
themes. 
• MA15+ classified content, which 
is provided by a mobile 
premium service or a service 
that provides audio or video 
content upon payment of a fee 
and that is not subject to a 
‘restricted access system’. This 
includes material containing 
strong depictions of nudity, and 
implied sexual activity.14  
 
At this stage, the Rudd Government 
proposal would restrict blanket 
mandatory ISP filtering to the illegal 
RC content, based on the ACMA’s 
‘black list’ of prohibited websites. The 
details are unclear, but it seems adults 
would be able to ‘opt out’ of the 
filtering of other levels of ‘prohibited 
content’, containing material that is 
either offensive or unsuitable for 
children.15  
 
4 Testing ISP level filtering 
In addition to censorship issues, ISP 
level filtering raises questions of a 
practical nature, concerning its 
reliability, scope and performance 
implications for the internet.  
 
It is reported that  
 
Internet providers and the 
government’s own tests have found 
that presently available filters are not 
capable of adequately distinguishing 
between legal and illegal content 
and can degrade internet speeds by 
up to 86 per cent.16
 
The reference is to the ACMA’s June 
2008 report, Closed Environment 
Testing of ISP-Level Internet Content 
Filtering, which found that, when filters 
were connected to the test network 
and were actively filtering, 
performance degradation varied ‘from 
a very low two per cent to 87 per cent 
between the best and worst performing 
filter products’.17  
 
The report went on to observe that 
despite the advances in ISP level 
technology:  
 
most filters are not presently able to 
identify illegal content and content 
that may be regarded as 
inappropriate that is carried via the 
majority of non-web protocols…18
 
Comment is made in this respect that 
neither the mandatory nor the optional 
filtering tier ‘will be capable of 
censoring content obtained over peer-
to-peer file sharing networks, which 
account for an estimated 60 per cent 
of internet traffic’.19
 
An earlier ACMA report found that: 
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Currently available filter products 
can filter static web content, but 
have limited effect for increasingly 
popular communication tools such 
as chat and instant messaging 
services. Research reveals that 
filters are generally most effective 
when addressing static content of a 
sexual nature on commonly 
accessed websites expressed in 
English.20
 
This last finding was based on a 
European Commission study which 
also reported that ‘over-or under-
blocking occurred in about 25 per cent 
of test cases’. 21 Thus, even the most 
efficient filters block legal material 
indiscriminately. 
 
5 Internet filtering software 
As an alternative to ISP-level filtering, 
users can install internet filtering 
software on their home computers. 
This is supported by the Federal 
Government, which provides filtering 
software free at NetAlert.com.au. 
These filtering programs commonly 
operate by blocking access to 
websites or website pages that have 
been included on a ‘black list’ of 
inappropriate sites. Some programs 
can block access to all websites 
except those included on a ‘white 
list’.22  
 
While views on their effectiveness can 
vary, in 2007 a US District Court 
accepted evidence that filtering 
programs ‘generally block about 95% 
of sexually explicit material’.23
 
A 2005 study on internet use in 
Australian homes reported on the 
extent to which parents use filtering 
software to prevent children from 
accessing inappropriate websites:  
 
Software to filter inappropriate 
websites was reported to be used by 
35 per cent of parents: 29 per cent 
used filtering software on a regular 
basis and six per cent on an 
occasional basis.24
 
One question is whether an added, 
mandatory tier of filtering is required, 
at the ISP level, to achieve the 
Government’s primary aim of providing 
‘protection for children from internet 
websites containing harmful content’? 
 
6 UK  
The Communications Act 2003 
provides the overarching framework 
for regulating telecommunications and 
broadcasting, and established the 
Office of Communications (Ofcom) as 
the joint regulator of these industries. 
However, the Act does not deal with 
the regulation of internet content, and 
this is not a regulatory responsibility of 
Ofcom.  
 
The Government’s position is that the 
law in the UK applies on-line in the 
same way as it does off-line and the 
Government has preferred to 
encourage self regulation of content by 
the industry. 
 
Increasing concern over internet users’ 
access to illegal content online led 
British Telecom (BT) in June 2004 to 
be the first UK Internet Service 
Provider (ISP) to introduce filtering of 
content on its network, known as 
Cleanfeed. The UK Government has 
since encouraged all UK ISPs to adopt 
similar filtering systems, and in 2006 
set a target that by the end of 2007, all 
ISPs which provided a broadband 
service would implement filtering at the 
ISP level. The existence of the target 
might lead the extent to which this is 
genuine self-regulation by the industry 
to be questioned. By the 16 June 2008 
the Government reported that 95% of 
ISPs had introduced filtering.  
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BT Cleanfeed, and filtering systems 
used by other ISPs make use of a list 
of websites hosting illegal content 
outside the UK compiled by the 
Internet Watch Foundation (IWF).  
 
The IWF is a self-regulatory body 
funded by the online industry. Within 
the UK it operates a “notify and take 
down system” where it notifies ISPs of 
potentially illegal content25 hosted in 
the UK which it has identified, or which 
has been reported by internet users to 
its hotline. As a result of this approach 
less than 1% of child pornography 
known to the IWF has been hosted in 
the UK since 2003, down from 18% in 
1997. 
 
The IWF also maintains a list of child 
pornography websites hosted outside 
the UK. The list typically contains 
between 800 and 1200 sites, and is 
updated twice a day. As the list is of 
precise websites or web pages, the 
risk of over-blocking is minimised. The 
list only contains websites and does 
not extend to other internet services, 
such as peer-2-peer networks, instant 
messaging or chat room activities.  
 
As BT itself admits, the Cleanfeed 
system is intended to prevent users 
inadvertently accessing illegal 
material, rather than to stop hardened 
paedophiles, and also will not prevent 
access to websites that are not on the 
IWF list. A number of ways in which 
both users and content providers could 
frustrate such systems have been 
postulated, and of most concern, is the 
suggestion that a user with the 
requisite technical knowledge could 
use a filtering system as an “oracle” to 
identify all the websites on the IWF list. 
 
The Byron Review “Safer Children in a 
Digital World” reported to the Prime 
Minister in March 2008 and considered 
the need for better regulation of the 
internet. The Review noted that there 
was a strong case for network level 
blocking by ISPs of child pornography, 
material inciting racial hatred or 
extreme pornography that was illegal 
in the UK. Considering the arguments 
for and against the blocking of other 
“inappropriate content” at the network 
level the Review concluded that this 
should not be pursued. However, the 
Review said this should be 
reconsidered if the other measures it 
recommended failed to have an impact 
on the number and frequency of 
children coming across harmful or 
inappropriate content online. The UK 
Government accepted all the 
recommendations of the review, 
including the creation of a Council for 
Child Internet Safety, which was set up 
in September 2008. 
 
In response to an adjournment debate 
in the House of Commons on internet 
regulation on the 16 June 2008, the 
UK Government said it recognised that 
the world had moved on since the 
Communications Act 2003, and 
explained that it had convened a 
“convergence” think tank which would 
report early in 2009, and would make 
recommendations for legislative 
change, where necessary. The 
Government said that in taking steps 
to protect the young or vulnerable 
online  
 
we need to do that in ways that do 
not unnecessarily impinge on 
freedom of speech, or try to create 
some kind of super-nanny internet. 
 
The Byron Review also recommended 
that the Council for Child Internet 
Safety should examine the law on 
harmful and inappropriate material 
could be usefully clarified (including 
suicide websites) and explore 
appropriate enforcement responses. In 
September 2008 the Ministry of Justice 
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announced the findings of its review of 
the law on suicide websites. It found 
that the Suicide Act 1961 could 
usefully be amended to make it clear 
that the offence in section 2 of of 
“aiding, abetting, counselling or 
procuring a suicide or a suicide 
attempt” applied to the encouragement 
of suicide through the internet. The 
Ministry of Justice’s announcement did 
not touch on the need for filtering of 
such sites.  
 
7 The EU 
The European Commission launched 
the Safer Internet Programme in 1999 
as the European Union’s response to 
the threat posed by illegal and harmful 
content on global networks. A revised 
Safer Internet Programme 2009-13 
was proposed by the European 
Commission in February 2008, and is 
scheduled to be finally adopted by the 
end of the year. The programme will 
have a budget of €55 million ($105 
million). Some of this funding is used 
to support a network of national 
helplines and watchdogs called 
INHOPE. The programme also seeks 
to encourage self-regulation by the 
EU’s internet industry to tackle illegal 
content.  
 
This approach has been reflected in 
the laws the EU has adopted on the 
Protection of Minors and Human 
Dignity in Audiovisual and Information 
Services, which have taken the form of 
recommendations, which are not 
binding on Member States. The most 
recent recommendation made in 2006 
urged the online services industry to 
examine the possibility of creating 
filters ‘to prevent information offending 
against human dignity’. 26  
 
8 Norway & Sweden 
In September 2004, Telenor, a leading 
Scandinavian telecom company and 
KRIPOS, the Norwegian National 
Criminal Investigation Service, 
announced that they were introducing 
a filtering system designed to prevent 
access to child pornography at ISP 
level for all its internet customers. The 
system would be based on a list of 
child pornography websites compiled 
by KRIPOS.   
 
In May 2005, Telenor and the Swedish 
National Criminal Investigation 
Department announced that a similar 
filtering system had been introduced 
for all Telenor’s customers in Sweden.  
 
9 Germany 
In Germany a code of conduct was 
drawn up between the internet 
watchdog FSM and search engine 
providers. As of early 2005 all major 
search engines in Germany filter 
search results that are harmful to 
minors, based on a list provided by a 
government agency in charge of media 
classification. The move is seen as a 
response to pressure for voluntary 
self-regulation by industry at the EU 
level, and arguably the fear among 
industry that a failure to comply will 
result in increased legislation.  
 
The German Federal Court of Justice 
ruled in December 2000 that material 
glorifying the Nazis and denying the 
Holocaust must be censored, 
regardless of where it is hosted. 
German ISPs have been ordered to 
block access to sites with such 
content. 27
 
10 Italy 
In January 2007 Italy passed a decree 
which requires ISPs to block access to 
child pornography websites within 6 
hours of being alerted to their 
existence. The National Centre against 
Child Pornography is responsible for 
notifying ISPs to block sites, and 
creating and updating a list of sites 
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considered as containing child 
pornography.  
 
In Italy the Autonomous Administration 
of State Monopolies (AAMS), a part of 
the Ministry of Economy and Finances, 
is responsible for issuing gambling 
licences. A law passed in 2006 
required ISPs to block access to 
gambling websites that did not have 
AAMS licences. The AAMS was 
responsible for drawing up the list. The 
UK based company William Hill said it 
would challenge the law in the 
European Court of Justice on the 
grounds that it is incompatible with the 
EU’s Single Market.   
 
11 United States 
The Children’s Internet Protection Act 
(CIPA) enacted in 2000, requires 
schools and libraries that accept 
federal funds to purchase computers 
or internet access to block or filter 
obscenity, child pornography, and, with 
respect to minors, material that is 
“harmful to minors.” 28  
 
The First Amendment right to free 
speech in the US Constitution has led 
to challenges to laws intended to 
regulate access to internet content. In 
2003, the Supreme Court held that 
CIPA was constitutional.  
 
The Child Online Protection Act of 
1998 sought to restrict access by 
minors to commercially distributed 
online materials that are harmful to 
minors. However the Act has never 
been enforced following legal 
challenge, and in March 22, 2007, a 
federal district court found COPA 
unconstitutional and issued a 
permanent injunction against its 
enforcement, a decision which was 
upheld in an appellate court in July 
2008. Any interference with the right to 
free speech must be the least 
restrictive alternative available. 
Material in the argument over the 
constitutionality of the Act has been 
the possibility of an alternative 
approach using blocking or filtering 
software. 29  
 
12 Canada 
Based on the UK model is Project 
Cleanfeed Canada, a voluntary 
scheme designed to prevent the 
accidental accessing of child 
pornography material. According to 
liberatus,net: 
 
On 23 November 2006, eight 
Canadian ISPs announced that they 
had ‘joined forces with Cybertip.ca, 
Canada's child sexual exploitation 
tipline, to launch a new voluntary 
initiative to help in the battle against 
online child sexual abuse’. 
 
13 New Zealand 
According to NetSafe, New Zealand’s 
Internet Safety Group: 
 
New Zealand has no mandatory ISP 
level filtering. There are some ISPs 
who filter voluntarily, however they 
tend to market themselves as 'family 
friendly' and it is considered part of 
their service.30
 
This is confirmed by David Cunliffe, 
the relevant Minister in the outgoing 
Labour Government, stating: 
 
The New Zealand government has 
no current plan to follow Australia 
into compulsory filtering of internet 
connections by ISPs…31
 
The Minister referred to a trial filtering 
program conducted with ISPs on a 
voluntary basis, saying ‘The trial 
currently blocks access to about 7,000 
websites that are known to deal 
exclusively with child sexual abuse 
imagery’. He added, ‘There are no 
plans for the programme to be 
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expanded to other types of illegal 
material’. 
 
14 Comment 
With the limited exceptions of 
Germany and Italy, mandatory ISP 
level filtering is not a feature of any of 
the countries reviewed. In place, 
rather, are voluntary ISP filtering 
schemes designed to prevent 
accidental access to a defined list of 
illegal sites containing child 
pornography. However, in the UK the 
position seems to be that the internet 
industry is encouraged to participate in 
this scheme, under threat of regulatory 
intervention should it fail to do so. The 
line between mandatory and voluntary 
participation is not clear-cut.  
 
Further information on the filtering of 
internet content in other countries is 
provided by the Open Net Initiative.  
 
In terms of the practicality of ISP-level 
filtering, various issues arise including 
the potential impact on internet speed 
and the indiscriminate blocking of 
innocuous material. There is also the 
point that URL based/index filtering 
only blocks access to pages on a pre-
determined list. In other words, access 
would only be blocked to material that 
has been identified as prohibited by 
the ACMA.32
 
According to Senator Conroy, the 
Rudd Government’s plans are at an 
early stage. The details of any 
mandatory filtering scheme remain to 
be determined.  
 
Glossary: 
Convergence – The bringing together 
of telecommunications, IT, the internet 
and television. 
 
Filter – Software for controlling what 
content is accessible to a user. 
 
Filtering – The process of actively 
identifying and blocking or permitting 
access to web content. 
 
Host – a company or organisation that 
makes websites available on the 
internet on behalf of a third party 
 
ISP – Internet Service Provider – a 
company that provides internet 
access. 
 
Peer-to-peer – A system which allows 
individuals to share data, typically 
used to share multimedia files. 
 
Protocol – A set of rules governing 
communication on the internet. 
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